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(A) Introduction 
The object of this paper is primarily to examine a 
selected number of leading cases which had purported to 
interpret what is a 'banker' and the 'business of banking'. 
These two terms are actually synonymous because to be a 
banker, as the proceeding will show, one must be in the 
business of banking. 
There is no one useful statutory definition as to 
who is a banker or what constitute the banking business. It 
is a notorious fact that statutory definitions for these two 
terms have been very elusive. Thus, it is only by turning 
to case law, much of it between fifty and even a hundred years 
old, that one might probably be able to discern some useful 
understanding as to what the terms may mean in the legal sense. 
Generally speaking, banking system j n New Zealand 
can be classified into three groups, namely, the Central Bank; 
the Commercial Banks; and the Savings Banks. Commercial banks 
may be divided into trading Banks and merchant Banks while 
Savings Banks comprise of the Post Office Savings Bank, 
Trustee Savings Bank and the Private Savings Bank. Savings 
Banks do offer cheque facilities nowadays. It is with the 
legal aspects of the business of the trading and savings 
Banks that this paper is concerned with. It necessarily 
excludes the Central Bank and the Merchant Banks. 
With respe ct to Merchant Banks, it has bee n said 
that the very term "Merchant Banker" is something of a 
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misnomer, for he is neither a 'Merchant' nor a 'Banker'. It 
has been likened to the Holy Roman Empire, which is neither 
Holy, nor Roman nor an Empire. It was said that: 1 
11 The merchant bank is certainly not a merchant, and 
despite its resources not a bank either, yet it is 
a key element in the financial establishments. Its 
basic function is to fulfil, and where possible to 
anticipate, the needs of industry over the whole 
spectrum of financial services. Its main business 
is not lending money or the custody of deposits, 
but the mobilisation of money, its management and 
strategic deployment based on specialist knowledge 
of national and international financial markets. 11 
No doubt they offer a wide range of investor 
services, including advisory services, research and the under-
writing of shares as well as lending money for expansion to 
growing companies. 2 Admittedly, as a result, they do overlap 
to some extent with that of trading banks. Nevertheless, 
they may be distinguished in that merchant banks do not open 
accounts for any member of the public who chooses to apply, 
and do not ordinarily issue cheque-books to their customers. 3 
2 
3 
V. Kanapathy, The Law, Corrunercial Banking and Malaysia's New Economic 
Policy: A Paper presented at the 2nd Malaysian Law Conference, 1973., 
at p . 16 . 
1974 N.Z. Yearbook p.823. 
Chorley, Law of Banking 1974 (6th ed.) p.3. 
• 
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(B) Some Statutory Definitions 
One of the most important statutes relating to 
Banking Law is certainly the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 (N.Z.) . 1 
Together with its very important corollary, the Cheques Act 
of 1960 1 , it is the dominant statutory influence in a banker's 
life. Under the Bills of Exchange Act the definition: 
II 'Banker' includes a body of persons, whether incorporated 
or not, who carry on the business of banking. 2 " 
Who or what is a banker can only successfully be defined 
otherwise than by reference to the business of banking. What 
is meant by the 'business of banking' is regrettably not 
defined although it has been said that its meaning may vary 
from time to time and from place to place. 3 
Morover the word 'includes' can itself be ambiguous. 
It would enlarge the definition or could be the equivalent of 
'means'. The word 'includes' suggests that it is possible to 
be a banker without carrying on a banking business, which to 
Lord Chorley "seems to be nonsense". 4 Authorities appear to 
be in agreement 5 that the word 'includes' is clearly equivalent 
to 'means' and this interpretation it is submitted is correct. 
The definition in section 2 of the Banking Act 1908 
states that Bank "means any person, partnership, corporation 
or company carrying on in New Zealand the business of banking." 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and Cheques Act 1957 U.K . 
Section 2 of respective N.Z. and U.K. Bills of Exchange Act. 
Bank of Chettinad, Ltd. of Colombo v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Colombo [1948] A.C . 378 at p.383. 
Chorley, op.cit. p.30. 
E.g. Paget, Law of Banking 1972 (8th ed.) p.8. 
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Though the word 'means' is used instead of 'includes', what 
is the 'business of banking' is again not defined. Interest-
ingly, a similar definition is given in section 76 of the 
Stamp and Cheque Duties Act 1971. 
Indeed, there are no statutory definitions of any 
value. All that the above-mentioned statutes, and a number of 
other statutes to be noted in the subsequent section of this 
paper, attempted to do was to define a banker as one carrying 
on the banking business, a definition which merely begs the 
question. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that this sort 
of statutory definition has been a subject of ridicule ever 
since. One writer has likened it to "a person who will lend 
you an umbrella when the sun is shining and ask for it back 
when it commenced to rain." 6 It is reminiscent of the witty 
but uninstructive definition of an archdeacon as a person who 
performs archidiaconal functions. 
Probably, as Lord Chorley suggested, the answer 
need not and indeed cannot consist of an all embracing 
definition as banks do undertake a great variety of functions. 
"It is rather a question of description than of definition, 
of fact than of law." 7 What has to be sought, therefore, is 
an essential minimum activity which in the eyes of the law 
constitutes a basic test for determining what is "the business 
of banking". 
6 
7 
H. Young, The Duties & Responsibilities of the Paying Banker and the 
Collecting Banker., Monograph published by The Bankers' Institute of 
Australasia 1966. 
Chorley, op. cit. p.31. 
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(C) The Need to Know the Meaning 
The term 'banker' or 'business of banking' or rather, 
its essential characteristics is of considerable practical 
importance for so many problems turn to the meaning of the 
term. 
In the first place, the meaning of the term 'banker' 
or 'the business of banking' has practical significance to the 
banker-customer relationship. If - but only if - one party to 
a contract is a banker certain wellknown implications result, 
whereas if that party is only a near-banker as for instance a 
finance-house and not within the definition, none of the usages 
that otherwise automatically arise will be applicable. 1 In 
other words, there are certain implied terms which only the 
banker and/or the customer can rely in the course of their 
business dealing. The relation between banker and customer 
is that of debtor and creditor; but one of the terms of the 
implied contract is that money lent to the banker is not 
payable except on demand Foley v. Hill. 2 
The implications of this unique banker-customer 
contractual relationship is epitomised in the oft-quoted 
judgment of Atkin L.J. in Joachimson v. Swiss Banking Corp-
oration : 
2 
" I think that there is only one contract made between 
the bank and its customer. The terms of that contract 
involve obligations on both sides .... The bank undertakes 
F.R. Ryder, The Business of Banking (Practical Aspe cts of the Legal 
Definition) Gilbart Lecture s on Banking 1970 at p . 3 . 
(18 48) 2 H. L. c a s . 28 . 
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'' to receive money and to collect bills for its customer's 
account. The proceeds so received are not to be held 
in trust for the customer, but the bank borrows the 
proceeds and undertakes to repay them. The promise to 
repay is to repay at the branch of the bank where the 
account is kept, and during banking hours. It includes 
a promise to repay any part of the amount due against 
the written order of the customer, addressed to the Bank 
at the branch, and as such written order may be outstand-
ing in the ordinary course of business for two or three 
days, it is a term of the contract that the bank will 
not cease to do business with the customer except upon 
reasonable notice. The customer on his part undertakes 
to exercise reasonable care in executing his written 
orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate 
forgery. I think it is necessarily a term of such 
contract that the bank is not liable to pay the customer 
the full amount of his balance until he demands payment 
from the bank at which the current account is kept." 3 
And in the second place, there are provisions in 
many statutes which expressly confer special rights and 
obligations, or what Lord Denning M.R. said 'privileges' only 
on bankers or those in the business of banking. In United 
Dominions Trust Ltd v. Kirkwood 4 , a case which will be 
examined in detail in due course, the Master of the Rolls has 
enumerated twelve instances of privileges which Parliament has 
accorded to bankers but has never defined who a banker is or 
what is the business of banking. 5 It is proposed to look at 
a few analogous instances in the New Zealand context so as to 
show why it is necessary to know the meaning. 
Under section 20 of the Banking Act 1908, a banker 
shall not, in any legal proceedings to which the bank is not 
party, be compellable to produce any books of the bank or to 
3 
4 
5 
[1921] 3 K.B. 110 at p.127. 
[1966] l Q.B. 783 High Court; 1966 2 Q.B. 431 Court of Appeal. 
ibid Court of Appeal, per Lord Denning M.R. at p.442. 
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appear as a witness in Court unless by order of a judge made 
for special cause. No definition is given of Banker save 
that it means 'any person, partnership, or company carrying 
on in New Zealand the business of Banking'. 
Wherever the word 'cheque' appears the meaning of 
bank is relevant. If the drawee is not a Banker the document 
is not a cheque since a cheque can only be drawn on a banker. 6 
A banker must pay his customer's crossed cheques only to other 
bankers. If the presenting firm is not generally recognised 
as a bank, and the cheque is refused, the banker will have 
broken his contract with his customer if the firm is shown to 
be, in fact, a Bank, while if he pays the cheque and the firm 
is not a bank he will lose his statutory protection: sections 
79, 80 Bills of Exchange Act 1908. Perhaps the most important 
in practice is that resultant upon section 5 of the Cheques 
Act 1960. This section replaced section 82 of the Bills of 
Exchange Act 1908 in providing protection to bankers who had 
converted cheques by collecting them for customers but who 
could establish that they came within the requirements of 
being "in good faith and without negligence". It may be 
observed that unlike the repealed section 82 Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908 which covered only crossed cheques, section 5 of the 
Cheques Act 1960 protects a banker who deals with all cheques 
crossed and uncrossed. Thus, if the person suing for 
conversion can establish that the "order" that has been 
converted was not given to a banker, the ordinary remedies 
6 S.73 Bills of Exchange Act 1908 of N.Z. 
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for conversion are available and the Collecting banker is 
vulnerable. The draft may be drawn on a finance house that 
in good faith erroneously considers itself within the 
definition; then bankers collecting these drafts will be 
bereft of their statutory protection against conversion. In 
short, if the drawee is not a banker there is no protection. 
The corollary appears to be that an institution 
paying a draft but failing to satisfy the definition of 
Banker will lose the protection afforded by the complementary 
provisions of sections 60 and 80 of the Bills of Exchange Act 
and by section 2 of the Cheques Act. All these are available 
only to paying bankers. 
Yet, no definition is given of banker s ave that it 
'includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not, who 
carry on the business of banking': section 2 Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908. 
Bankers are also given special exemption from 
registration under the Moneylenders Act 1908 and from all the 
stringent provisions therein. Section 2 states : 
II 'Moneylender' includes every person (whether an individual, 
a firm, a society, or a corporate body) whose business is 
that of moneylending ..... , but does not include -
(d) Any person bona fide carrying on the business of 
banking ..... " 
This paragraph in section 2 expressly protects bankers from 
being subject to the heavy penalties and restrictions contained 
in the Act itself. 
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The consequences of non-compliance with the 
provisions of the Moneylenders Act, if the institution 
concerned is not a bank or otherwise fail to come within such 
an exemption (under paragraph (d) ) can make debts irrevocable 
and securities worthless as well as giving rise to direct 
penalties earlier mentioned. These serious implications will 
be appreciated when we come to discuss the well-known case 
United Dominions Trust v. Kirkwood. 7 In the meantime, suffice 
to quote from Lord Denning M.R. in this regard : 
"Parliament seems to think that it is possible for a 
moneylender readily to know whether he is carrying on 
a banking business or not, because if a moneylender 
publishes an advertisement implying that he is carrying 
on a banking business, he is guilty of a criminal 
offence : See section 4 of the Moneylenders Act, 1927. 
Yet Parliament does not attempt to define what a banking 
business is. " 7 
Finally, reference may also be made to the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act 1908, an Act relating to the 
registration of industrial and provident societies. Section 
2(1) of its 1923 Amendment Act states : "A society which may 
be registered under the Principal Act is a society for 
carrying on any industry, business, or trade, whether wholesale 
or retail .... but except the business of banking. " Again, 
there is no definition of what is 'the business of banking'. 
Though these examples are by no means exhaustive, 
they are sufficient, for our purpose, to show the need to know 
the meaning of the term "business of banking". In other words 
what is a banker and what constitutes the banking business has 
real and practical commercial consequences. It is precisely 
because of the lack of any satisfactory statutory definition 
that one has to turn to case law for possible guidance. 
7 op.cit. per Lord Denning M.R. p 443 (emphasis supplied). Se also S.7 
of N.Z. 's Moneylenders Amendment Act 1933. 
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(D) Judicial Interpretations 
In the proceeding discussion of case law the writer 
proposes to adopt, as far as possible, a historical or 
sequential approach culminating at the 1966 U.D.T. case, a 
case which is generally regarded as the modern decision of the 
meaning business of banking. Incidentally such approach 
would also enable one to have a better appreciation on the 
development of judicial thinking in this aspect of the law 
which is never static. It is, however, not intended to delve 
in any depth those older authorities especially those of the 
late 19th century. The reasons are that our main concern is 
to attempt to deduce the essential characteristics of banking 
as it exists today and, when the 'business of banking' varies 
from one generation to another it is obvious that one must 
be cautious of the value of old cases. And secondly, it will 
be clear from the immediate discussion that they were, in any 
event, lacking in any consistency on the interpretations of 
the very term 'business of banking'. 
(i) The Earlier Decisions ·-
In one of the earliest English cases Re District 
Savings Bank, Ltd., Ex parte Coe (1861) 1 a savings bank formed 
to receive deposits and conduct emigration operations was held 
not a banking company since money could not be withdrawn on 
demand or by cheque. Turner L.J., said 
"Even that branch of the Company's business which has 
the most resemblance to banking differs materially 
from the ordinary business of banking, for the company 
(1861) 3 De. G.F. & J. 335 cited in Paget p.10 op. cit. See too 
[1862] 5 L.T. 566. 
- 11 -
"did not honour cheques payable on demand or drawn 
upon themselves. " 1 
His Lordship said that the Company not only did not pay moneys 
received by them upon cheque s payable on demand, but was in 
the habit of paying into other bankers the money which it so 
received from depositors, just as if it were an individual 
customer of those bankers, and it withdrew such moneys by 
means of cheques. 2 
Yet, thirty years later, a society that only took 
loans on deposits was said to be in reality carrying on the 
business of banking. In re Bottomgate Industrial Co-
operative Society (1891) 3 the society registered under the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1862 received money 
on deposit and paid it out in very much the same way as a 
trustee savings bank receives money on deposit. The said Act, 
however, prohibited such registered society from carrying on 
banking business. A.L. Smith J., said: "the business 
embarked on by the society when it took loans on deposit was 
in reality a banking business prohibited by the statute. It 
is not necessary, in our judgment, in order to constitute a 
banking business prohibited by the statute, that the society 
should carry on every part of a business carried on by some 
bankers; it is sufficient to bring the business within the 
prohibition, if the society carried on what is the principal 
2 
3 
(1861) 3 De. G.F. & J. 335 cited in Paget p.10 op . cit. See too 
[186zj 5 L.T. 566. 
[1862] 5 L.T. 566 at p.568. 
[1891] 65 L.T. 712 at p.714. 
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"part of the business of a banker, viz., receiving money on 
deposit, allowing the same to be drawn against as and when 
the depositor desires, and paying interest on the amounts 
standing on deposit. " 3 
It has been thought that the above decision has 
the approval of a more recent English Court of Appeal case 
of R v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal; Ex parte East Anglian 
Trustee Savings Bank 1954 4 where Lord Goddard C.J., was noted 
to say that "although the trustee savings bank .... does not 
carry on the business of banking in the same ways as one of 
the Big Five banks in the sense of issuing cheque books to 
its customers and performing various services for them, but 
it nevertheless carries on the business of banking." 4 It must, 
however, be observed that the question in issue in that case 
was not whether the party was a bank, but whether it was 
engaged in "a trade" or "an undertaking" so as to attract the 
authority of an Industrial Disputes Tribunal to settle a wage 
dispute between the trustee savings bank and its employees. 
The reference to the Bottomgate Society's case by the Chief 
Justice was incident~d and, with respect, unnecessary to the 
decision which was not even averted to by the other two Court 
of Appeal judges - Cassels and Slade J.J. The Chief Justice's 
reference was therefore no more than mere obiter since it 
seems clear that the Court's attention was never directed to 
the question whether the said savings bank was carrying on 
the business of banking. 
3 
4 
(1891) 65 L.T. 712 at p.714. 
[1954] 1 W.L.R. 1093 per Goddard C.J. at p.1096. 
' 
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Although these older English decisions appear to 
be in conflict there seem to be more emphasis on the need 
to have current accounts where money deposited would be with-
drawable by cheques. On the other hand, Irish and Australian 
decisions of the contemporary period tended to stress more on 
mere deposits as sufficient banking business. These decisions 
are relevant because they have generally modelled their law 
upon the English common and statute s law . 
Thus, in a 1900 Irish case Re Shield's Estate, 5 it 
was held that acceptance of money on deposit account not 
subject to withdrawal by cheques makes the acceptor or 
institution a bank. The facts were as follows. Business 
was carried on by one Michael Shields in two rooms house in 
three towns and attendance being one day per week in each 
of these places. Money was lent on promissory notes, payable 
in twelve weeks, with interest at the rate of ½din the tl 
per week. Advances were also made on mortgages. Large sums 
were received on deposit for which, first promissory notes 
payable three months after date and later deposit receipts 
were issued. Small sums up to LS were also lent without 
taking any security. The books kept were primitive and 
cheques , passbooks, letters of credit or discount bills were 
not issued or dealt with. Nor were there current accounts 
being kept with the firm. However, evidence given showed 
that the firm was commonly known as a bank in their business 
dealing and officials of the Bank of Ireland had also called 
the firm bankers. 
5 (1901) 1 I.R . 172 . 
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The parties to the case were the petitioners the 
Bank of Ireland which became the respondents in the Court 
of Appeal. The Trustees of Michael Shields' firm were the 
Appellant in the Appeal Court. The point of the case was 
as to the validity of certain mortgages given to the 
Petitioners the Bank of Ireland by the Appellants' firm to 
secure advances. Under the Irish statuteof 33 George 2, C.14 
those mortgages must be registered if the Appellants' firm 
was a banker or else it would be void as against the mortgages 
the Bank of Ireland. The purpose of the Act 33 Geo. 2, C.14 
(Ireland) was said to have been shown in its preamble which 
recited that the trade and manufacture of the state were 
mainly carried on by promissory notes and accountable receipts, 
given by bankers, and that the credit and currency of their 
notes would be better promoted by giving more effectual 
securities to the creditors of such bankers than they have 
hitherto. It made void conveyance of real estate by bankers 
if not registered within a month after execution : and in 
section 8 it was enacted that in case a banker stopped payment 
all his real and personal estate would be liable to the 
payment of debts without regards to priority other than debts 
secured by conveyance registered as aforesaid. 6 
The question for decision was - was Michael Shields 
a banker within the meaning of 33 Geo. 2, C.14 (Ireland) or a 
mere moneylender? 
Ross J. in the Court of 1st instance emphatically 
held that Shields was not a bankE:r since the primal element in 
banking was wanting, namely, the paying out of money on cheques. 
6 ibid per Ashbourne, C. at p.193. 
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His Honour said: "The importance of this element is dwelt 
by Turner L.J. in Ex parte Coe (3 De Gex. F. & J. 338) 
where he deals with the branch of the company's business that 
had most resemblance to banking; he says it differed most 
materially from the ordinary "business of banking", for the 
company did not honour cheques payable on demand and drawn 
upon themselves. This element of the business is to the 
ordinary mind the primal - the most notorious and the best 
understood - of all the services the banker renders to society, 
and it is hard to imagine how the ordinary commercial man 
could look on any establishment as a bank when current accounts, 
pass-books, and cheque-books are unknown." 7 
The decision of Ross, J. was, however, reversed by 
an unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal comprising of 
four judges. 8 It was not clear what the ratio decidendi was 
except it was held that Michael Shields was a banker within 
the meaning of 33 Geo. 2, C.14, and that the mortgages created, 
not having been registered, were levelled. Nevertheless, it 
has been widely considered that this case was authority for 
the proposition that the receipt of deposits and the payment 
of interest thereon is sufficient to be considered as in the 
business of banking. 9 Thus, Holmes L.J. said : "Whatever 
be the attractions offered to the public, the real business 
7 
8 
9 
ibid per Ross J. at p.187. 
ibid. Before Lord Ashbourne, C. and FitzGibbon, Walker and Holmes, L.JJ. 
E.g. Counsels' submissions in U.D.T. case. 
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"of the banker is to obtain deposits of money which he may 
use for his own profit by lending it out again. 1110 Perhaps 
the decision is epitomised by the dictum of FitzGibbon L.J. 
who said that - "If he keeps open shop for the receipt of 
money from all who choose to deposit it with him; if his 
business is to trade for profit in money deposited with him 
for that purpose, he answers the description of a 'banker' .... 
those who take money "on deposit account" are just as much 
bankers as those who hold it "on current account". II 1 1 
It is noteworthy that FitzGibbon L.J. and to a lesser 
extent Holmes L.J., were the only two judges in the Court of 
Appeal who had specifically dealt with the characteristics 
of banking in general. 
It is respectfully submitted that, contrary to the 
admittedly established view, the case on closer analysis 
could not be regarded as authority for the above proposition 
that a company would be a banker and in the business of 
banking if it only accepts money on deposit and lends out 
same for profit. It was a decision which turned solely on 
an interpretation of a specific statute which was about 150 
years old by the time the case came before the Court of 
Appeal but, nevertheless, was still in force. 33 Geo. 2, C.14, 
(Ireland) passed in 1759 and was a statue which was based on 
certain public policy of the time. In the writer's opinion 
the primary reasonings and, consequently, decisions of all 
1 0 
1 1 
op. c it. per Holmes L.J . at p.207 . 
op. cit. per FitzGibbons L.J. at p.198. 
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the judges were actually directed in satisfying the very 
purpose in which the statute was originally enacted. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeal's decision was also 
further influenced by the particular facts of that case in 
that the petitioners the Bank of Ireland had all along, 
consistently, until the litigation, recognised the appellants' 
firm as a bank and in the business of banking. It was only 
at the litigation that the Bank of Ireland, somewhat oddly, 
attempted to argue that Shields' firm was not a bank but a 
moneylending company. Indeed, it would seem that on this 
very point, the petitioner the Bank of Ireland would have been 
estopped from turning back to argue what they otherwise 
recognised as a bank. 
The writer's contention can best be supported by 
reference to some of the relevant passages of the four 
respective judges. 
Lord Ashbourne, c. ·-
Thus, after setting out the facts the learned Lord 
Chancellor proceeded to note that Mr Shields was described 
in the books of the Bank of Ireland as a banker. He said: 
1 2 
"The letter of Mr Johnston, their agent at Omagh, is 
entitled to great weight, because it indicates 
unmistakably how their trained and experienced officials, 
before any litigation had occurred, deliberately 
described the firm. It is entitled to great weight in 
considering the question whether Michael Shields at 
the time when the equitable mortgages were created, 
was a banker within the meaning of the statue 33 Geo. 2, 
Cl4 (Ireland). " 12 
op. cit. per Ashbourne, C. at pp 192 and 195-6 respectively 
(emphasis added). 
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In another p~ssage, his Lordship continued to 
stress on this recognition character as well as showing, quite 
clearly, that his decision really centred on the statute in 
question 
"They called themselves bankers, were called so by the 
customers, and are entered on the very books of the 
petitioners themselves as such. Are they to be 
declared not to be bankers, because they kept no 
current accounts? This is the main contention of the 
respondents. 
11 The Bank of Ireland urged that the primal element in 
banking is the paying out money on cheques. This might 
be urged possibly now with some plausibility, but I do 
not think it could be so argued at the date of the 
passing of 33 George 2, C.14 ..... Cheques were not 
at all as common then as now. We must remember the 
mischief against which 33 Geo. 2, C.14, was directed. 
We must consider what banks were then, and I do not 
think that at that date a bank which performed the 
other duties of a bank, but which did not pay cheques, 
would be less regarded as a bank. nu 
Walker L.J. ·-
In almost similar vein to Lord Ashbourne C., 
Walker L.J. began by posing the question which was "whether 
Michael Shields was a banker within the meaning of 33 Geo. 2, 
C .14. 11 His Lordship then said 
12 
13 
"The ... contention (of the Bank of Ireland) was that 
the omission to have current accounts with customers, 
and consequent omission to give cheque-books .... . 
deprived Shields of the position of banker ... . 
11 What we have to consider is whether the omission affects 
the application of 33 Geo. 2, C.14. The right to draw 
in respect of current account arises from the desposit 
of money with bankers at call, which the depositor by 
contract can draw upon his order, called the usage of 
bankers, his cheque. The difference in this contract 
and that contained in the ordinary deposit receipts, is 
one only of terms, and the evil struck at in favour of 
depositors with a banker by the statute equally applies." 13 
op. cit. per Ashbourne, c. at pp 192 and 195-6 respectively 
op. cit. per Walker L.J. at p.204. 
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Holmes, L.J. ·-
The mischief against which the statute attempted 
to be directed to was well brought out by Holmes, L.J. His 
Lordship's words that "the real business of the banker is to 
obtain deposits of money which he may use for his own profit 
by lending it out again" 14 has always been taken out of its 
context by scholars and lawyers as authority for the 
proposition that the essential feature of banking was merely 
the acceptance of deposits from customers. In fact, when his 
Lordship uttered these words, he has the particular statute 
in mind for immediately after that utterance, he proceeded 
to say in a long passage : 
14 
"Let me now see whether it is possible to ascertain 
from the language of the statute of 1759, whether this 
is the conception of a banker to be found therein. 
Its title .... shows its object to be to provide a 
better means than previously existed for the security 
and payment of debts due by bankers - that is to say, 
of the debts the incurring of which is the principal 
feature in a banker's business. If appears from the 
preamble and other portions of the statute that the 
debts in contemplation were debts secured or evidenced 
by promissory notes and accountable receipts; the 
former being debts due in respect of the note issue, 
and the latter being debts due in respect of money 
deposited ... the mischief they were intended to 
counter-act was the false credit arising from the 
apparent possession of property that had been made the 
subject of secret charge or disposition - a mischief 
which would be specially operative in the case of those 
whose lodgments or deposits were not intended to be 
speedily withdrawn. Thus .... the legislature 
contemplated persons who, as the essential part of their 
business, obtained money and credit from the public, 
and that this is the class designated as bankers. " 
14 
op. cit. per Holmes L.J. at p207. 
- 20 -
FitzGibbon L.J. 
His Lordship seems to be the only member of the 
Court who has explicitly defined the terms 'Banker ' and 'the 
business of banking' for general purposes, independent of and 
apart from the meaning attributed to them under the 1759 
statute. In his Lordship's view, if a person's business "is 
to trade for profit in money deposited with him for that 
purpose, he answers the description of a 'Banker'. " After 
holding that Shields was a banker in the ordinary sense in 
which that term is said to mean, his Lordship also concluded 
that Shields was a banker under the said Act which, being 
unrepealed, was still applicable - "The Shields were old-
fashioned bankers, and the old-fashioned Act is all the more 
applicable to them on that account." 15 
Putting the writer's contention and the above 
passages in support aside, we have nevertheless noted that 
the Shields' Estate's case has always been taken as authority 
for the proposition earlier mentioned by subsequent cases 
when appropriate. 16 In a 1915 High Court of Australia's case 
Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria v. 
Permewan Wright & Co. Ltd 17 it was said that payment of 
cheques was not a necessary part of the business of banking. 
In that case, a savings bank was held to be a banker within 
the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909. 
15 
16 
17 
op. cit. per FitzGibbon L.J. at pp 198 and 200 respectively. 
E.g. Commercial Bank v. Hartigan (1952) 86 I.L.T. 109, but case 
turned solely on the interpretation of the Central Bank Act 1942. 
(1915) 19 C.L.R. 457. 
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The facts were these. The Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Permewan Wright & Co handed some 58 crossed cheques to their 
clerk to be drawn on the Royal Bank of Victoria as payment 
for customs duties. The clerk, however, fraudulently paid 
all into his own account at one of the Appellants' savings 
banks. This was possible because these cheques though 
crossed, were nevertheless written to be paid to "Duties or 
bearer". The Appellants' savings bank as the collecting 
banker received payment from the Royal Bank and credited 
them to the clerk's account. The Plaintiffs thereupon sought 
to recover the total sums of the cheques plus damages from 
the Appellants for conversion. The Appellants argued that 
they were protected from liability under section 88 of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1909. 
Two issues were raised for determination in the 
High Court, namely: (1) Whether the Appellants' savings 
bank was a bank and in the business of banking for the 
purpose of the Bills of Exchange Act, and (2) If it is, has 
it been so negligent as to be disentitled for relief under 
section 88? The second issue, of course, does not call 
for further discussion in this paper. As to the first issue, 
four out of five members of the Court held that the 
Appellants' savings bank was indeed a bank within the meaning 
of the Bills of Exchange Act. 18 To the majority, the mere 
fact that the savings bank only accept deposits repayable 
when or as agreed was sufficient to constitute the banking 
business. To them, bankers were not bound in law to provide 
current accounts. 
18 Australian Bills of Exchange Act 1909 . Majority judges were Issacs, 
Gavan Duffy, Rich and Powers J.J. while Griffith C.J. dissented. 
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The question of what is "carrying on banking 
business" was dealt with in the principal judgment of Issacs J. 
wherein the other majority members fully concurred. In a 
rather lengthy passage, but worthy of quote, his Honour 
said: 
"The fundamental meaning of the term is not, and never 
has been, different in Australia from that obtaining 
in England ..... The essential characteristics of 
the business of banking are, however, all that are 
necessary to bring the appellants within the scope of 
the amendments; and these may be described as the 
collection of money by receiving deposits upon loan, 
repayable when and as expressly or impliedly agreed 
upon, and the utilization of the money so collected 
by lending it again in such sums as are required. 
These are the essential functions of a bank as an 
instrument of society. It is, in effect, a financial 
reservoir receiving streams of currency in every 
direction, and from which there issue outflowing 
streams where and as required to sustain and fructify 
or assist commercial, industrial or other enterprises 
or adventures. 
" If that be the real and substantial business of a 
body of persons, and not merely an auxillary or 
incidental branch of another business, they do carry 
on the business of banking. The method by which the 
functions of a bank are effected - as by current 
account, deposit account at call, fixed deposit account, 
orders, cheques .... and any other modes - are merely 
accidental and auxilliary circumstances any of which 
may or may not exist in any particular case. I agree 
as to this with what was said by FitzGibbon L.J. in 
re Shields' Estate. " 19 
On the other hand, the sole dissentient Griffith C.J. 
was equally emphatic in holding that the Commissioners were 
not carrying on banking business because depositors could not 
operate upon their accounts by cheques, to wit, current 
accounts. The Chief Justice in an important passage said 
19 op. cit. per Issacs J. at pp 470-471. 
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11 In Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. I p.568) it is 
said that 'the business of banking, strictly speaking, 
is the receipt of money from or on account of a 
customer, to be repaid on demand or when drawn on by 
a cheque. In the case of banks lawfully issuing bank 
notes such issue is part of banking business; and in 
a note it is added - the collection of crossed cheques, 
being a statutory necessary, is part of the business 
of banking, but is included in the above definition. 
The numerous other functions undertaken by modern 
bankers, such as payment of domiciled bills, custody 
of valuables, and discounting bills, do not come within 
the strict definition of banking business. The 
judicial recognition of the banker's lien - Brandon v. 
Barnett 12 CL & F., 787 - implies the inclusion in 
banking business of the making of advances or the 
granting of overdrafts to customers.' I do not know 
of any better or more authoritative definition. In my 
opinion an institution upon which it is not lawful to 
draw a cheque is not a banker within the meaning of 
the Bills of Exchange Act. " 20 
Although the views of Griffith C.J.were not 
accepted by the other members of the High Court, it was 
nevertheless significant. It echoed what once had been 
admitted by Ashbourne c. in Re Shields' Estate on the import-
ance of cheques transactions. More importantly, it directed 
attention to the Bills of Exchange Act wherein it was pointed 
out that the duties and privileges of bankers especially in 
regard to cross cheques "show that the bankers intended 
were persons whose business includes the honouring of cheques 
drawn upon them by their customers and dealing with crossed 
cheques, both by way of paying such cheques drawn upon them 
and collecting cheques cross generally or crossed specially 
to themselves. 11 21 
Indeed, the idea that the acceptance of deposits 
with interest and repayment on demand is sufficient to 
20 
21 
op. cit. per Griffith C.J. at p.465. 
ibid at p.464. With the introduction of the Cheques Act 1960 (N.Z.) 
especially S.5, this point becomes the more stronger. 
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constitute a banking business is also difficult to reconcile 
with textbooks' authorities. Paget's Law of Banking, 5th ed. 
(1947) at page 5 states the position as follows : 
"Some of the older dicta seems to give undue prominence 
to the deposit side of banking. In view of the 
provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act, and the latter 
affirmation of cheque business as the leading feature 
of a bank concern, the scale would appear to have 
turned. 
"Again, looking at the crossed cheques sections of the 
Bills of Exchange Act, the consequent restriction on 
the encashment of crossed cheques save through a 
banker, and the universal and legally encouraged use 
of crossed cheques, the collection of such cheques 
must be regarded as an inherent part of a banker's 
business. It is therefore a fair deduction that no 
one and no body, corporate or otherwise, can be a 
'banker' who does not : 
1. take deposit accounts; 
2. take current accounts; 
3. issue and pay cheques drawn on himself; 
4. collect cheques for his customers. " 
Hart's Law of Banking 4th ed. (1931) at page 1 
provides the following definition : 
"A Banker or Bank is a person or company carrying on the 
business of receiving moneys, and collecting drafts, 
for customers subject to the obligations of honouring 
cheques drawn upon them from time to time by the 
customers to the extent of the amounts available in 
their current accounts. " 
These authorities emphasize what no doubt for most 
people is the main function of a bank, namely, the honouring 
of customers' cheques to the extent of the credits in their 
accounts. It was the absence of this function which led to 
Griffith C.J. 's dissenting judgment in the Australian Savings 
Bank's case. 
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(ii) Recent Decisions ·-
In a more recent leading case of Bank of Chettinad, 
Ltd, of Colombo v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Colombo 
(1948) 1 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has lent 
emphasis to the need for current accounts as being essential 
to the business of banking. The Appellant bank at the 
material time had its Head Office at Rangoon, Burma and a 
branch in Ceylon. In the course of carrying on its business 
in Ceylon the Ceylon branch paid a sum of money to the Head 
Office by way of interest on money advanced by the Head Office. 
The Bank claims that the sum should be allowed as a deduction 
under Rule 1 of the Board of Income Tax Rules it being a 
'bank'. This rule contemplates a Ceylon branch of a non-
resident banker. 
The relevant definitions in Rule 1(1) are as 
follows II 'Bank' means any non-resident banker within the 
meaning of those expressions as defined in section 2 of the 
Income Tax Ordinance. 'Ceylon Branch' means the business 
carried on in Ceylon by any such bank." 'Banker' in section 2 
of the Income Tax Ordinance was said to carry the matter no 
further for it defines a banker as "any company or body of 
persons carrying on the business of banking." 
Nevertheless, in order to succeed in its claim the 
Bank has to show that it was carrying on the business of 
baking in Ceylon. What is meant by the 'business of banking' 
fell on the Court to decide. 
(1946) 47 N.L.R. 25 Supreme Court of Ceylon; [1948] A.C. 378 P.C. 
See too a Canadian case which also stressed on honouring customers' 
cheques and drafts : Re Bergethaler Waisenamt [1949] 1 D.L.R. 769. 
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In the Supreme Court of Ceylon, Counsel for the 
Bank relied on a dictum of FitzGibbon L.J. in Re Shields' 
Estate wherein his Lordship interpreted 'Banker' as one 
"who traffics with the money of others for the purpose of 
making profits" even though he issued no cheque books and 
did not honour drafts on demand. This dictum was however 
rejected by the Ceylon Court for Rose J. said 
"Whatever may be the position under Irish Law, it seems 
to me that that is too wide a conception of a bank 
according to the Law of England and Ceylon. " 2 
His Honour sought the assistance of section 330 
of the Companies Ordinance of 1938 in interpreting the terms 
'Banker' and 'Business of Banking". A "banking company" 
according to section 330 "means a company which carries on 
as its principal business the accepting of deposits of money 
on current account or otherwise, subject to withdrawal by 
cheque, draft or order .... " In his Honour's judgment 
(which the Acting Chief Justice Soertsz concurred) it was 
said that section 330 though came into force six years later 
then the Income Tax Ordinance of 1932, "merely crystallised 
what was already the legal conception of a 'bank' in Ceylon." 3 
This was implicitly approved by the Privy Council 
for in their Lordships' view, "a valuable guide to the 
meaning of these words (i.e. Banker and Banking business) is 
afforded by S.330 of the Companies Ordinance of 1938." 
"Moreover," their Lordships added, "the definition in S.330 
in no way conflicts with the meaning attached to the work 
'banker' in England in 1932." 4 Accordingly, their Lordships 
2 (1946) 47 N.L.R. 25 per Rose, J. at p.27. 
3 ibid at p.28 and in P.C. at p.383 op. cit. 
4 op. cit. at p.383. 
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formulated the test for determining whether a person or body 
was engaged in the business of banking to consist in "the 
accepting of deposits of money on current account or other-
wise, subject to the withdrawal by cheque, draft or order." 4 
Applying this to the Appellant Bank's in Ceylon, it was held 
that "there was no evidence that any moneys on deposit could 
have been withdrawn by cheque, draft or order.'' 5 Consequently 
the appeal was dismissed. 
Admittedly, the decision turned on an ascertainment 
of the meaning "business of banking" for the purposes of the 
Income Tax Ordinance and not directed to the Bills of Exchange 
Act or any other statute. And admittedly too, it relied on a 
statute,the Companies' Ordinance, which has specifically 
defined the term 'business of banking'. However, it is 
respectfully submitted that the decision is persuasive 
authority for the view that some form of current accounts is 
essential in the business of Banking and especially so for 
the purposes of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (UK). That 
this is so could indirectly be inferred from their Lordships' 
statement that the definition in S.330 of the Ceylon Companies' 
Ordinance 1939 "in no way conflicts with the meaning attached 
to the work 'banker' in England in 1932". Presumably their 
Lordships have in mind the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 wherein 
the word 'banker' appears. Arguably therefore, it could 
similarly be applicable to the Bills of Exchange Act especially 
when one recalls that 'banker' in the Bills of Exchange Act 
is defined as : "includes a body of persons . . .. who carry 
4 
5 
op. cit. at p . 383. 
ibid p.384 
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on the business of banking" whereas section 2 of the Ceylon 
Income Tax Ordinance was defined as : "means any company or 
body of persons carrying on the business of banking." 
The Judicial Committee's view has subsequently found 
favour with the Court of Appeal in England in the most recent 
and much discussed case of United Dominions Trust Ltd v. 
Kirkwood (1966) . 6 It is not intended to delve into a detail 
analysis of the sort of business transactions that gave rise 
to the dispute. Nor is it intended to discuss the point 
related to bona fide for it has been clear from the case that 
there has been no suspicion of mala fide on the part of the 
United Dominions Trust Ltd. What the writer will examine 
is the substantive question : the meaning of business of 
banking. 
The relevant facts were as follows. The plaintiffs/ 
Respondents United Dominions Trust Ltd (hereinfafter called 
U.D.T.) lent tSOOO to the Lonsdale Motors Ltd Company and 
in return the said company accepted five bills of exchange, 
each for tlOOO drawn on them by U.D.T. The defendant/ 
appellant, Mr Kirkwood, who was Managing Director of the 
company, endorsed them. The bills were not met on presentation 
and notice of dishonour was given to the defendant. Since the 
company was in liquidation, U.D.T. brought this action against 
Mr Kirkwood as endorser. It was not in dispute that Kirkwood 
has no defence whatever except under the Moneylenders' Act 1900. 
He pleaded that U.D.T. were unregistered moneylenders, and 
therefore, could not recover the sum claimed. 
6 United Dominions Trust Ltd v. Kirkwood [1966] 1 Q.B. 783 H.C. 
[1966] 2 Q.B. 431 C.A. 
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U.D.T. however argued that they came within the 
first limb of exception (d) to section 6 of the Moneylenders 
Act 1900. The material words of the section provide that 
"the expression 'moneylender' in this Act shall include every 
person whose business is that of moneylending, or who 
advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any 
way as carrying on that business; but shall not include ... 
(d) any person bona fide carrying on the business of banking." 
In support of their claim, U.D.T. produced evidence 
that they receive money on deposit, and pay interest on it, 
and that they operate 'current accounts', on which customers 
draw cheques which passed through the clearing system and are 
paid on presentation. They had no difficulty in showing too 
that they are widely regarded as bankers by other bankers of 
established standing and, inter alia, by the Inland Revenue, 
which has permitted them to account for stamp duty on cheques 
by composition fee, and allowed tax repayment claims in 
respect of interest charged without deduction of tax, both 
of which were only applicable to bankers. 
Mocatta J. in the High Court considered this 
evidence satisfactory and held that the defendant's debts 
were therefore enforceable. With regard to the peculiar 
nature of the current accounts criticised by the defendant's 
counsel, his Lordship was nevertheless of the view that the 
mutual rights and liabilities of banker and customer in 
relation to them were the same as arose in the case of current 
accounts with the joint stock banks. 7 Consequently, there 
7 ibid per Mocatta J. at p.795. 
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there was ''no valid gound for disregarding them in deter-
mining whether on the evidence the plaintiffs carry on the 
business of banking within the definition." 7 
Though Mocatta J. tends to accept Paget's definition 
of the business of banking, it must however be noted that he 
has confined his decision to the facts before him and has 
expressly refrained from deciding that any particular activity 
is an essential characteristic of the Banker. 8 
Against this decision, the defendant appealed to 
thE: Court of Appeal. The interest of the appeal lies in the 
wide ranging discussion in the three judgments delivered on 
the nature of the business of banking. While the result was 
that by a majority, the appeal was dismissed, the approach of 
each of the majority judges differed from each other (and 
from Mocatta J.); and it seems that if the evidence given 
at the trial had been more fully probed - as it well might 
be if U.D.T. were to bring an action against some other 
borrower - the result could have been the other way. Lord 
Denning M.R . held that U.D.T. 's reputation suffice to 
qualify them as bankers whereas Diplock L.J. considered that 
they were bankers, but the reasoning which led him to this 
conclusion was quite different from the Master of the Rolls. 
Harman L.J. was of the opinion that U.D.T. were not bankers 
and that the defendant was entitled to succeed. It is the 
writer's humble belief that the three judgments delivered 
warrant special examination with the hope that a consensus 
opinion of the Court could be deduced on the meaning 'the 
business of banking'. 
7 
8 
ibid per Mocatta j . at p.795 
ibid at p.790 
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The Judgment of Lord Denning M. R. 
Earlier in his judgment Lord Denning noted that 
'bankers are a privileged class .... They are an exclusive 
circle to which entry is limited. ' 9 He then listed twelve 
instances of privileges afforded to bankers under the English 
legislations. In none of the statutes is any definition of a 
banker vouchsafed, beyond the common one of "a person carrying 
on the business of banking", which business is itself 
undefined. Lord Denning then went on to consider the 
characteristics of a modern banker. Observing that the march 
of time has taken us beyond the stage where in 1914 the High 
Court of Australia in Permewan Wright & Co. Ltd, was able to 
hold that the absence of cheque accounts did not prevent the 
State Savings Bank from being a Banker, the Master of the 
Rolls said: 
"Money is now paid and received by cheque to such an 
extent that no person can be considered a banker unless 
he handl e s cheques as freely as cash. Whereas in the old 
days it was a characteristic of a banker that he should 
receive money for deposit, it is nowadays a characteristic 
that he should receive cheques for collection on behalf 
of his customer. Whereas in the old days he might with-
draw it on production of a passbook and no cheque, it is 
nowadays a characteristic of a bank that the customer 
should be able to withdraw it by cheque, draft or order. 1110 
The two characteristics here mentioned, viz. (1) 
accepting money from and collecting cheques for their customers; 
and (2) honouring cheques drawn on them by their customers, 
bring with them, in Lord Denning's view, a third characteristic 
of bankers, viz. (3) the keeping of current accounts, or 
something similar , in which the appropriate credits and debits 
are recorded. These three characteristics were acknowledged 
lO ibid p. 446 . 9 ibid p .44 2 
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to be much the same as those appearing in the then current 
edition of Paget (6th ed. 1961 p.8): "No-one and nobody, 
corporate or otherwise, can be a 'banker' who does not (i) 
take current accounts; (ii) pay cheques drawn on himself; 
(iii) collect cheques for his customers." 11 
Testing U.D.T. 's business against these character-
istics alone , Lord Denning found that it would not have 
qualified as a banker. 12 To conduct hire-purchase finance by 
means of discounting bills or promissory notes, to accept 
deposits repayable after fixed periods, to make loans of all 
sorts, all of which U.D.T. did in common with many bankers, 
would not have been enough. Nor would the keeping of certain 
accounts which we re called 'current accounts', but which 
amounted to little more than a record of a customer's borrow-
ings and which were completely uncharacteristic of an ordinary 
banker's current accounts. "But", said Lord Denning M.R., 
"it must be remembered that a recital of usual charact-
eristics is not equivalent to a definition. The usual 
characteristics are not sole characteristics. There 
are other characteristics which go to make a banker. In 
particular stability, soundness and probity .... A 
banker is easier to recognise than to define. In case 
of doubt it is, I think, permissible to look at the 
reputation of the firm amongst ordinary intelligent 
commercial men. " 13 
'Reputation,' said the Master of the Rolls, 'may exclude a 
person from being a banker: so also it may make him one.' 
"Our commercial law has been founded on the opinion of merchants. 
Lord Mansfield himself used to have his own special jurymen 
of the city of London who sat regularly with him. He took 
11 
12 
13 
ibid p .447. 
ibid p.453 . 
ibid pp .45 3 -4. 
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their opinion as to what was the practice : and laid down the 
law accordingly." 14 The Master of the Rolls said he would 
follow Lord Mansfield's example. Thus, on the basis that 
U.D.T. had long been recognised in responsible quarters as a 
bank and had been afforded the privileges of a banker, such 
as clearing house facilities and permission to print 'duty 
paid' on its cheques, Lord Denning concluded that the Court 
should not now declare it not to be a bank. Lord Denning was 
of course fully conscious (or over cautious?) of the 
inconvenience and serious implications to U.D.T. if the 
decision was to be against them.~ 
The Judgment of Harman L.J. 
Harman L.J. dissented. His Lordship approved the 
definition applying in Ceylon - Bank of Chettinad case - in 
which the Privy Council indicated did not conflict with the 
meaning of bank in England in 1932, namely: 
"a company which carries on as its principal business 
the accepting of deposits of money on current account 
or otherwise subject to withdrawl by cheque, draft or 
order. " 16 
Like the Master of the Rolls, Harman L.J. also 
observed that U. D.T. had no deposit accounts in the relevant 
sense. 17 Though large sums of money were deposited with it, 
they were repayable only at stated times and not on notice. 
In other words, they were merely 'short-term loans' and 'if 
this sort of transaction constituted a banker, the building 
societies would be bankers, which admittedly they are not. ' 17 
Again, like the Master of the Rolls, his Lordship also concluded 
14 ib id p . 454 . 
1 5 ibid pp. 4 55- 6 
1 6 op . c it. per Harman L.J. a t p .45 7 . 
17 ibid p.458. 
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that U.D.T. had no current accounts either. Those so-called 
'current accounts' numbered some 1400 all of them except about 
90 were with traders conducting business with U.D.T. which 
were called Traders' accounts. The 90 were called private 
accounts but were not explored before the court. The accounts 
with traders, as it appeared to the Court, were used (a) to 
receive as credits amounts provided as finance by U.D.T. and 
(b) to pay out against the traders' cheques amounts drawn 
against his finance. Cheques drawn by traders in this way 
were paid into the credit of their accounts with one or other 
of the clearing banks. U.D.T. were at all times prepared to 
pay cheques drawn on these accounts and payable to third parties. 
However, in His Lordship's view, these accounts were merely 
vehicles for providing finance. 18 
And again, like Lord Denning M.R., Harman L.J. was 
also of the view that it was essential for a person claiming to 
be a banker to show that he collects cheques on behalf of his 
customers -
11 It seems to me that nowadays when payment by cheque has 
become the recognised way of discharging day-to-day debts 
that the collection of cheques on a customer's behalf is 
as essential a part of the service provided by a banker 
as is receipt of cash from the customer. 11 18 
Up to this point there was no marked divergence 
between the views of the Master of the Rolls and Harman L.J. 
The divergence came in relation to the question of reputation, 
a matter which was decisive in the favour of U.D.T. according 
to Lord Denning. Harman L.J. could not accept that reputation 
could save U. D. T. for II reputation alone is not enough." 19 
18 
19 
ibid pp 459-60. 
ibid p 461. 
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His Lordship, however, did recognise the serious consequences 
of his decision, found against U.D . T . 
The Judgment of Diplock L.J. 
Although he agreed with Lord Denning M. R. in dismissing 
the appeal, Diplock L . J . shared with Harman L.J. the view that 
a person could not be a banker merely because commercial men 
and bankers so regarded him. Of importance was not what the 
person did with the money - for instance, lending it at 
interest - but the terms on which be obtained it. It was 
therefore essential that a banker should accept from his 
customer 
"loans for an indefinite period upon running account, 
repayable as to the whole or any part thereof upon demand 
by the customer either without notice or upon an agreed 
period of notice. " 20 
Such loans are repayable on the customer's cheque, 
draft or order.w Diplock L.J. was inclined to agree with the 
Master of the Rolls that today it is also essential that the 
banker should be bound to honour cheques drawn upon him by his 
customers payable to third parties and to collect cheques on 
his customers' behalf. 20 However, his Lordship proceeded to 
qualify his words that it was, nevertheless, not necessary for 
him to d e cide whe the r it would still be possible to carry on the 
business of banking without undertaking the payment of cheques 
drawn on the customer's account. 21 
Like the other two judges, Diplock L.J. also came to 
the conclusion that the two basic essentials, namely deposit 
~ op . c it . per Dip loc k L . J. at p. 4 6 5 . 
21 ibid p. 466 . 
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accounts and current accounts were lacking in the business 
of U.D.T. As regard the former his Lordship said: "What 
U.D.T. calls 'deposit accounts' are short-term loans of money 
of agreed duration .... not withdrawable upon notice but are 
repayable without notice by either side at the end of the 
agreed period." 22 As regard the latter, his Lordship pointed 
out that in the cross-examination of Mr Garrett (a director 
of U.D.T.), all that emerged was that not more than twenty 
per cent of traders had 'current accounts' at all, that of 
those with current accounts, 'not very many' used them for 
payment of cheques drawn in favour of third parties or 
collection of cheques drawn by third parties, and that even 
those that did, the extent to which they did so was 'small 
I imagine' . 23 Once one eliminates the kinds of transaction 
recorded in the 'current accounts' of Lonsdale Motors Ltd as 
not being in the legal nature of banking transaction at all, 
the evidence of Mr Garrett left, in his Lordship's view, a 
"complete lacuna" whether or not the banking transactions 
which the U.D.T. carried out constituted more than a negligible 
part of their business.~ 
Was that lacuna capable of being filled by evidence 
of the reputation which U.D.T. enjoyed in banking and 
commercial circles of being itself a 'banker' ? 23 After 
anxious reflection and still professed to be in 'considerable 
doubt' his Lordship, nevertheless, concluded, but for reasons 
which differed from Lord Denning M.R., that reputation might 
be enough to fill the lacuna arising from the fact that the 
22 ibid pp 467-8. 
23 ibid p. 4 7 3 . 
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evidence did not disclose that U.D.T. were actually carrying 
on the business of banking -
"Unless the grounds of the witnesses' belief were probed 
in cross-examination and shown to be mistaken, such 
evidence in an ordinary case might be sufficient in 
itself to establish a prima facie case that U. D.T. was 
bona fide carrying on the business of banking.''~ 
U.D.T. An Evaluation 
It is proposed here to look into two broad aspects 
of the case as arose from the foregoing discussion - firstly, 
the case itself and how far the three judgments, viewed as a 
whole have contributed to clarifying or settling the term 
'the business of banking; and secondly, the decision of the 
case as to how far it is compatible with the reasoning of the 
majority judges, especially Lord Denning M.R. 
Although the case really relates to the interpret-
ation of 'bona fide carrying on the business of banking' for 
the purposes of the Moneylenders Acts and, therefore, strictly 
speaking, would apply only to the definition in that particular 
statute, it is, nevertheless, clear that the judgments were 
directed more to the nature of banking business generally. 
In other words, the case has in fact produced a number of 
significant dicta , however obiter, on the meaning of the term 
'business of banking' which are highly persuasive for general 
purposes and in particular, in respect to the Bills of Exchange 
Acts. 
It appeared that all three judges in the Court of 
Appeal agreed that the basic characteristics of a banker were 
those as set out in the then current adition of Paget's Law 
24 ibid p . 474 . 
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of Banking (1961) 6th ed. at page 8, namely: (1) take current 
accounts, (2) pay cheques drawn on himself and (3) collect 
cheques for his customers.~ 
More significant was the fact that all three judges 
were of the opinion that testing U. D.T. 's business upon the 
above basic characteristics, U.D.T. could not be said to have 
been carrying on the business of banking. The Court was in 
agreement that U.D.T. had neither dealt with deposit accounts 
nor current accounts. Nor was there any evidence that U.D.T. 
had collected cheques. One would have thought that having 
reached such a stage and in such a state of unanimity, the 
Court would have determined the case against U.D.T. That was, 
of course, not so, for by a majority decision, it ended in 
favour of U.D.T. on the basis of reputation. It is here that 
we turn to the decision particularly the decision of Lord 
Denning M.R. 
Indeed, it was precisely at this point that Harman 
L.J. departed from his brethren and decided not to proceed 
any further. Harman L.J. concluded that U.D.T. could not 
succeed on the ground of their reputation and so the appeal 
by Kirkwood ought to be allowed. While allowing the appeal 
his Lordship also noted that he was fully aware of the serious 
implications his decision would have had on U.D.T. 26 
25 Lord Denning M.R. clearly approved it at p.447F; Diplock L.J. was 
inclined to agree though said it was not necessary to decide; and 
Harman L.J. has pointed out characteristics which were clearly 
identical to Paget's requirements, see for e.g., at p.457 Eon 
current accounts; p458 line 3 and p.459 G on the Collecting of 
cheques and Payment of same. 
26 op. cit. per Harman L.J. at p.461. 
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Admittedly, Harman L.J. 's reasonings and conclusion 
were the most consistent amongst the three judgments delivered. 
It is, nevertheless, suggested that its consistency was 
because of the adherence to strict legal principles. In the 
writer's view, a 'legalistic approach' or legalism without 
due regard to commonsense and the reality of the situation may 
sometimes be undesirable and, unfortunate, as Harman L.J. 
himself has recognised. It is the writer's respectful 
submission that the majority decision, Lord Denning's in 
particular, was preferable and could be justified in the 
circumstances of the case. As noted previously, Paget's 
definition of the term 'business of banking', with which all 
members of the Court of Appeal were apparently in agreement, 
was not a definition which was expressly directed to the 
Moneylenders Acts. In fact it was a definition capable of 
general application. If there is to be any specific statute 
to which the definition could be argued to be of more 
relevance, it would certainly be the Bills of Exchange Acts. 
It is suggested that Harman L.J. 's "legalistic approach" has 
fallen into this trap for his Lordship has failed, in the 
writer's opinion, to examine the very object behind the 
Moneylenders Acts before applying any seemingly established 
principles of law. 
On the other hand, Lord Denning M.R. was able to 
direct his mind, ultimately, to the very statute in issue 
the Moneylenders Acts - and examine the purpose for which such 
statute was created. This is vital because there are many 
statutes, noted in the beginning, which are concerned with 
bankers and the business of banking, and they are concerned 
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with them for widely differing purposes. It may well be that 
a definition which would be satisfactory in connection with 
one statute would be unsuitable, if not misleading, for the 
purposes of another. It was primarily because of this 
recognition that the Master of the Rolls was able to come to 
the decision he made. This was evident in the concluding 
part of his judgment when he said: 
"The ultimate question is : Is U.D.T. to be classed as 
a banker and accorded the privileges attaching to that 
status; or is it to be classed as an unregistered 
moneylender and treated as an outlaw unable to recover 
the debts due to it? U.D.T. is not the sort of person 
against whom the Moneylenders Acts were directed. It is 
not rapacious, extortionate or unmerciful. It is 
sensible, moderate and reasonable. " 27 
It is also suggested that Lord Denning's decision 
could be rationalised from a broader angle - that is, through 
the general principle of "equity of fairness". Thus one 
prominent authority on Banking Law 28 has noted that the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in this U.D.T. case was 
"a vivid exemplification of the judicial functions" shown at 
its best. The proper nature of this judicial function was 
believed to have been succinctly made by Mr Justice Cardozo 
who has demonstrated that although Judges are bound by precedent 
they are often able to differentiate between the facts before 
them and the principles of an earlier age thereby maintaining 
an element of flexibility. 
Cardozo : 
In the words of Mr Justice 
"Uniformity ceases to be good when it becomes the uniform-
ity of oppression. The social interest served by 
symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against 
v op. cit. per Lord Denning M.R. at pp 455-6. 
28 F.R. Ryder, Gilbert lectures 1970. op. cit. at p.16. 
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"the social interest served by equity and fairness or 
other elements of social welfare. These may enjoin 
the judge upon the duty of drawing the line at another 
angle, of staking a path along a new course, of 
marking a new point of departure from which others who 
come after him will set out upon their journey. " 29 
It may be said that Lord Denning did not, by his 
decision, purport to set any new path "from which others who 
come after him will set out upon their journey" for this was 
certainly not necessary. What the decision did was merely to 
see that 'equity and fairness' did in the end prevail over 
the other party, which, even Harman L.J. has recognised as 
one that "is wholly without merit". 30 Indeed Lord Denning 
has been very cautious to see that his decision should not be 
used blindly as precedent for he has warned other similar 
companies like U.D.T. to ask the Board of Trade for a cert-
ificate if they should wish to be regarded as Bankers. In 
short, Lord Denning's decision could also be justified on the 
ground that the defendant's case was wholly devoid of any 
equitable merits and depends for its success solely upon a 
particular construction of certain provisions of the Money-
lenders Acts. 
29 
30 
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, cited in Ryder ibid p.2. 
op. cit. per Harman L.J. at p.461. 
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Conclusion 
Two observations may be made from the preceding 
examination of case law. Firstly, it will be appreciated 
that those old cases 1 which maintained the views that mere 
acceptance of deposits and the lending out of same would be 
sufficient to constitute 'the business of banking' had 
clearly been discredited by subsequent cases like the Bank 
of Chettinad 2 and of course U.D.T. 2 The Court of Appeal in 
this latter case has expressly disapproved three old cases 
which have earlier been discussed in this paper. "If they 
were still the law, it would mean that the building societies 
were all bankers." 3 The corollary to this appears to be 
that those contrary views, especially in the minority, that 
considered deposits withdrawable on demand and by cheque, 
draft or order as essential characteristics of the business 
of banking have at last gained acceptance : In re District 
Savings Bank Ltd., Ex parte Coe, per Turner L.J. 4 , In re 
Shields' Estate, per Lord Ashbourne 5 and Permewan Wright & 
Co. Ltd, per Griffith C.J. 6 
Secondly, it will be noted that the cases we have 
so far considered relate to a variety of specific statutes. 7 
E . g. In re Bottomgate Industrial Co-o erative Societ (1891) 65 L.T. 
712; In re Shields' Estate 1901 1. I.R. 172; Permewan Wright & Co. 
Ltd. (1915) C.L.R. 457. 
2 [1948) A.C. 378 and [1966]2 OB 431 respectively. 
3 ibid per Lord Denning M.R. p.446 and cases in note l above. 
4 (1861)3 De G.D & J. 335 per Turne r L.J. at p.338. 
5 op.cit. per Lord Ashbourne C. at p.195. 
6 op .cit. per Griffith C.J. at p.465. 
7 Thus for instance, In re Bottomgate the Industrial & Provident 
Societies Act 1862; In re Shields the Irish statute of 33 George 2, 
C.14. 
- 43 -
Interestingly, with the exception of the Permewan Wright & 
Co. Ltd case, there did not seem to have been any cases which 
have dealt specifically with the term 'banker' or 'business 
of banking' for the purposes of the Bills of Exchange Acts. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, those decisions were only 
legally binding in relation to the respective statutes they 
were dealing with. Yet, a perusal of those cases revealed 
that the Courts, in interpreting the term 'banker' or 
'business of banking', have rarely confined their interpret-
ations to the specific statute in question. Instead, they 
have somehow (perhaps inevitably) interpreted the term 
business of banking in its wider connotation, and have 
invariably, though with varying degrees, made reference to 
the Bills of Exchange Acts. 
Thus, for instance, in the Bank of Chettinad case, 
a case which relates to the Ceylon Income Tax Ordinance of 
1932, the Privy Council was able to say that 'the definition 
in S.330 (of the Ceylon Companies Ordinance 1938) in no way 
conflicts with the meaning attached to the word 'banker' in 
England. 118 As the writer has suggested, their Lordships 
clearly had in mind the English Bills of Exchange Act when 
uttering those words for the word 'banker' appears therein. 
The best example is still the U.D.T. case. Though 
that case was dealing essentially with the question as to the 
requirements of the Moneylenders Act 1900 in relation to the 
business of banking, we have already seen that there were 
8 op. c it. at p.3 8 3. 
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significant dicta of the Court of Appeal which were clearly 
intended to allude to the essentials of banking in relation 
to a wider sphere than the interpretation of section 6 of 
the Moneylenders Act 1900. Lord Denning M.R. from the 
beginning of his judgment has explicitly referred to the 
Bills of Exchange Act and accepted Paget's three criteria 
as the basic characteristics of the business of banking. 9 
Indeed Lord Denning's allusion to the banking business in 
general could also be inferred from the evidence, which he 
relied, given by the City bankers, in that those evidence 
were not given as to the meaning of 'bona fide carrying on 
the business of banking' for the purpose of the Moneylenders 
Act but was general as to whether U.D.T. were regarded as 
bankers without any limitation to the aforesaid statute. 10 
Similarly, Harman L.J., after quoting the headnote 
of the Permewan Wright & Co. Ltd case, a case which relates 
specifically to the Australian Bills of Exchange Act 1909, 
added that he thought that collection of cheques was an 
additional requirement of the business of banking. 11 An 
obvious reference to the English Bills of Exchange Act and 
the Cheques Act. Likewise, Diplock L.J. at p.463 said: 
"The second question is : what are the essential character-
istics of the business of banking? Apart from exemption 
from the requirements of the Moneylenders Acts, the statute 
law recognises a number of immunities and privileges peculiar 
to bankers." His Lordship then alluded to the crossed 
cheques sections of the Bills of Exchange Act, which, as 
9 
ro 
ll 
op. cit. per Lord Denning M.R. at pp 445-6. 
ibid pp 454-6. 
op. cit. per Harman L.J. at pp 457-8. 
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we have seen, could only be utilised amongst bankers. Then 
he proceeded to discuss a number of old cases and in 
particular expressly considered the dicta of Holmes L.J. 
in In re Shields' Estate and Isaacs J. in Permewan Wright 
& Co. Ltd as adopting too wide a definition of banking. 
And without particularising in any way the Moneylenders Act, 
within the next few paragraphs he reached his comments on 
the Paget definition with which he was 'inclined to agree' 
as correctly stating the essentials of the business of 
banking.u 
Thus, it is submitted that all the dicta in the 
U.D.T. case could indeed be regarded as relating to 'banking' 
in its wider connotation and especially in relation to the 
Bills of Exchange (as well as Cheques) Acts, except where 
a judgment specifically alluded to the definition in the 
Moneylenders Act. Those dicta, put in a nutshell, were an 
endorsement of Paget definition which could reasonably be 
concluded as the basic characteristics of the business of 
banking today for the purposes of the Bills of Exchange Act 
and the Cheques Act - taking money on current accounts; 
payment and the collection of cheques. On these criteria, 
all Trading Banks and Savings Banks in New Zealand would 
clearly be in 'the business of banking' for the purposes 
of the Bills of Exchange Act. The former have long provided 
~ op. cit. per Diplock C.J. at p465. 
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current accounts while the latter have since 1974 been 
allowed to offer cheque facilities. 13 
It seems that Savings Banks have since 1964 been statutorily 
considered to be in the business of banking for the purposes of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1908 and certain enactments of the Banking Act 
1908. See: Private Savings Bank Act 1964 section 24; Trustee 
Savings Bank Act 1948 section 38A and Post Office Act 1959 section 
118A. But prior to 1964, the position was not at all clear as to 
whether savings banks are bankers and in the business of banking when 
they did not operate current accounts or provide complete chequing 
facilities. However, according to the writer's colleague Mr L.B. 
Roper, a legal officer attached to the P.O.S.B. Wellington, the 
contemporary view was that the New Zealand Courts would follow the 
Permewan Wright & Co. Ltd case. 
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